Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
Making and breaking goverments offers a theorical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The heart of a parliamentary regime is the process by which the elected representatives choose a goverment, consisting of a cabinet and ministers, to serve as the executive arm of the regime. Strategic interaction among parliamentary parties creates new governments and either maintains them in office or, after a resignation or vote of no confidence, replaces them with some alternative government. The authors formulate a theorical model of this strategic interaction, derive consequences, formulate empirical hypotheses on the basis of these, and test the hypotheses with data drawn from the postwar European experince with parliamentary democracy.
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